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WEEKLY REPORT**THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM**

13 April 1966

**INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE**

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THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(7 April - 13 April 1966)

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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

The threat of violence, which last week loomed increasingly in both Da Nang and Saigon, has at least momentarily subsided, but political maneuvering in this period of respite has apparently placed the Ky government in increasing jeopardy. Top Vietnamese officials now anticipate that the National Political Congress, called by the government to hammer out the transitional steps to civilian rule, will endorse the Buddhist position favoring early assembly elections. Even if the military regime agrees to abide by such a decision, it remains questionable whether it will be able to survive the interim period prior to elections.

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I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

A. POLITICAL SITUATION

1. Both the Ky government and the Buddhists acted last weekend to reduce the possibilities of serious bloodshed in Da Nang and Saigon, but the ensuing political interplay has placed the government's survival in increasing jeopardy. The Buddhists have succeeded in arousing a broader civilian clamor for more representative government, and they have hardened their position against the present regime's serving even in an interim capacity. These developments have aggravated the strains within the government and the military hierarchy, subjecting Premier Ky to conflicting pressures and increasing the danger of rash action by restive elements.

2. After reviving its plans for a show of force against antigovernment elements in Da Nang, the Ky government apparently became convinced that armed clashes would probably result and merely worsen the situation. As a result, the government's three marine battalions, which were sent to Da Nang air base in preparation for "reoccupying" the city, have now been withdrawn. A new I Corps commander, General Ton That Dinh, has replaced the temporizing General Chuan, and has been addressing himself to the problem of trying to restore command authority over local military units supporting the "struggle movement." The city itself, meanwhile, is still being administered by antigovernment authorities, including the controversial mayor, Dr. Man. There has been, however, some effort in I Corps by military and civilian authorities, as well as by Buddhist elements, to mute some of the more blatantly anti-American propaganda that has played into Viet Cong hands. The appointment of General Dinh, a native of Hue and a member of the former Minh junta, is in itself a gamble. He has in the past demonstrated personal ambitions and a flair for demagoguery at least as effective as that displayed by former I Corps commander Thi, who is still in Hue.

3. In Saigon, demonstrations last week by Buddhist youths were increasingly taking the form of

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violence and attacks on US personnel--to the point of suggesting considerable Viet Cong penetration. The Buddhist Institute acted over the weekend to dissociate itself from street disorders and to assume formal direction of future antigovernment demonstrations. In a series of communiques, which exhorted the faithful to observe church discipline, the Buddhist leaders also reiterated their lack of confidence in "promises" by the Ky government. This position was spelled out even more strongly at a press conference on 12 April, in which Buddhist leaders reiterated their demands for an elected constituent assembly and their opposition to the present government. Newer demands that government troops be removed from Da Nang air base and that no reprisals be taken against antigovernment elements were also repeated. This press conference was attended by Tri Quang and other militants, but Buddhist Institute chairman Tam Chau was not present.

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[redacted] Chau does not wish to identify himself with the harsh line and tactics espoused by Tri Quang, but that he evidently intends to abandon any effort to temper these policies.

4. Several non-Buddhist groups, including some Catholic organizations and a loose coalition of Catholics, southern politicians, and representatives of the sects, added their voices over the weekend to the call for an early return to civilian rule. These groups, which also called for orderly transitional processes, apparently hope to serve as a counterweight to the Buddhists and perhaps to be in a position to have some influence on any future government.

5. The government on 12 April convened its National Political Congress, designed to provide a public forum for determining the form and timing of steps to restore civilian rule. The congress was widely criticized by pro-Buddhist elements--especially in radiobroadcasts of "struggle movement" leaders in I Corps--as a government trick to deflect the popular aspirations for democratic government. However, reports of considerable sentiment among congress delegates for an elected assembly apparently have prompted the Buddhists to reconsider their initial boycott in

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the hope of swinging the congress behind their position. Government officials now state that they are resigned to a congress decision favoring the election of a constituent assembly within four to six months.

6. If this proves to be in fact the congress consensus, the major remaining problem is whether or not the Ky government--and the military Directorate itself--can remain in office until elections are held. The Buddhists have virtually committed themselves to the position that the present regime cannot be entrusted with supervision of the transitional period. Monk Tri Quang has in fact implied the Catholics now agree with this position and are pushing for the appointment of retired General Tran Van Don, a member of the former Minh junta, as interim premier. Quang said that this would be an "ideal" solution, inasmuch as both Buddhists and Catholics consider Don acceptable and realize that some political balance must be struck. Although the prospects for Catholic-Buddhist cooperation are open to question, there is evidence that Don has been actively approaching various power groups in an apparent effort to pave the way not only for his own eventual return to prominence, but also possibly of other leaders of the Minh regime.

7. Any request by the National Political Congress that the Ky government step down before election, could trigger new trouble. Premier Ky indicated [REDACTED] 25X1

25X1 [REDACTED] he would resist any such pressure, and hinted that he had considerable support from lower-ranking military officers who would act to prevent his ouster. There are at present some 12 Vietnamese military battalions in the Saigon area, ostensibly to keep order in anticipation of an imminent resumption of Buddhist protest demonstrations on a major scale.

8. The Saigon area commander, General Khang, has also reported that field-grade officers have been restive over the government's lack of strong action in the case of Da Nang, and are now desirous of forcing certain top-level changes in the military command. It is not clear whether these restive officers, or the troops now in Saigon, would continue

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to support Ky himself if they decided to take action against the present antigovernment elements. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that certain members of the present military junta and the cabinet, divided as they now appear to be, may not be maneuvering against one another in order to strike their own best arrangements in any emerging realignment of political power.

Economic Situation

9. Although the business community in Saigon is seriously concerned about the current political situation, many businessmen appear to be more anxious over the extent of the US commitment and size of the AID program. The present consensus of Saigon businessmen and banking interests is that a serious interruption of business activity and a significant increase in capital flight is not likely unless the political situation deteriorates substantially.

10. Import activity has increased from the slowdown period which followed the execution of the Chinese businessman, in part because importers may have concluded that the government is now willing to tolerate a certain amount of black market activity. The minister of economy has moved to suspend police visits to import firms, has invited new importers to apply for import licenses--thus reversing the policy of not authorizing new importers, and has quietly allowed a rise in banking fees from three to six percent.

11. The slowdown in import activity has had relatively little effect on other sectors of the economy. No government action is being taken against industrialists in the anti-corruption campaign because high profits are now necessary for capital formation. Construction and real estate sectors are also unaffected. The US consul in Hue reports that the economic situation there is not cause for great concern at present, although continued obstruction of movement of consumer goods through the Da Nang port could cause serious shortages of important items soon. In these northern cities, the cost of living has increased an estimated 5-10 percent as prices of imported goods have risen sharply. Rice prices have shown only minor fluctuations while food prices in general have remained fairly stable.

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12. Embassy Saigon reports that a variety of developments during the past two months have led to a reappraisal of the anti-inflationary strategy developed during October-December 1965 which was designed to limit inflation to 33 percent in 1966. The embassy estimates that the full package of new taxes and liquidity measures agreed upon at Honolulu are not likely to be implemented. In addition, congestion at the port of Saigon continues to restrict the amount of goods which can be imported into the country. Finally, it will be necessary to provide wage increases of about 40 percent for Vietnamese Government civilian personnel by June or July. The outlook is for a greater degree of inflation than had been envisaged earlier in the year and for changes in US strategy toward acceptance of inflation of prices of non-essential goods, together with increased efforts to hold down the prices of essential commodities. The embassy's revised strategy calls for continued emphasis on financing large increases of imports, improving import procedures, pressing for tax increases and liquidity measures, and providing wage increases for civil servants in June or July.

13. Retail prices in Saigon rose appreciably during the week ending April 14. The USAID retail price index was up five percent from a month ago as most meat, fish, vegetable, and rice prices rose. Imported commodity prices also rose, with the most pronounced increases in condensed milk, wheat flour, and cement. Importers had reportedly ceased selling their stocks and instead were holding them because of the uncertain political situation.

14. In the Saigon free market, \$10 bills and \$10 MPC (scrip) rose by one piaster per dollar each to 167 and 116, respectively. Gold rose by two piasters, thereby reversing the downward trend. In Hong Kong, the piaster-dollar cross rate was unchanged at 155.

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B. MILITARY SITUATION

1. The over-all level of Communist-initiated activity decreased for the week ending 9 April.

2. During the period there were 815 Communist-initiated incidents compared to last week's 905. There were five attacks (all small scale) and 537 acts of terrorism compared to last week's eight and 651 respectively. The kill ratio favored free world forces 5.7 to 1 compared to last week's recomputed ratio of 3.4 to 1. Viet Cong losses for the period were 785 killed and 140 captured. Vietnamese casualties were 67 killed and 24 wounded (missing/captured not reported)--a total of 278 compared to last week's 518. United States losses for the week were 95 killed, 501 wounded, and two missing/captured--a total of 598 compared to last week's 803. Other free world forces' losses decreased from 69 to 40. The South Vietnamese lost 36 weapons, while the Viet Cong lost 248 (3 crew-served). Chieu Hoi figures were not reported for the period by COMUSMACV.

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA/ CAPTURED</u>	<u>TOTAL CASUALTIES</u>
US	95	501	2	598
ARVN	67	211	0	278
THIRD COUNTRY	15	25	0	40
VIET CONG	785	---	140	925

GVN/Allied Activities

3. Friendly large-unit operations and corresponding enemy contacts decreased, but small-scale operations increased. In I Corps, US Marines terminated Operation ORANGE in Quang Nam Province after 11 days. Friendly losses were 18 US killed and 92 US wounded against Viet Cong losses of 57 killed, six captured and three weapons.

4. In II Corps, the 14-day, multibattalion Operation LINCOLN (conducted in the Pleiku-Darlac

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province area) terminated on 8 April with US losses of 41 killed, 93 wounded, three UH-1D Iroquois helicopters destroyed, and one M-48A3 tank damaged. Friendly forces inflicted losses of 453 killed, 12 captured, and 88 individual and eight crew-served weapons on the Viet Cong. Elements of the 101st Airborne Division continued Operation FILLMORE with US losses of seven killed and 71 wounded. Enemy losses to date are 151 killed and 31 captured. Operation BUN KAE 66-5 conducted by elements of the ROK Capital Division ended in Binh Dinh Province with friendly losses of 23 killed and 63 wounded. Viet Cong losses were 292 killed and 74 captured.

5. In III Corps, the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, concluded Operation CIRCLE PINES in Binh Duong Province on 5 April. Total US losses were 32 killed, 195 wounded, two armored personnel carriers destroyed, and 14 armored personnel carriers, 12 trucks, and three UH-1B Iroquois helicopters damaged. The Viet Cong lost 170 killed, eight captured, and 50 weapons. On 7 April, the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, conducted Operation KAHUKA in Hau Nghia Province. Resulting US losses were eight wounded and one UH-1B helicopter destroyed while Viet Cong losses were 29 killed and 12 weapons captured. Combined US/free world forces Operation ABILENE continued in Phuoc Tuy Province with cumulative US losses of 46 killed and 120 wounded. The Viet Cong have lost 55 killed and 22 captured.

6. In the Rung Sat Special Zone, US Marine forces completed Operation JACK STAY on 6 April. Friendly losses totaled five killed, 31 wounded, and two missing. US Marines killed 63 and wounded six Viet Cong and captured 66 weapons. Friendly troops were successful in destroying enemy arms factories, a training camp, an elaborate hospital system, and extensive supplies of ammunition found in the area.

7. A two-day multibattalion search and destroy operation by ARVN forces in Phong Dinh Province of IV Corps resulted in friendly losses of 26 wounded. The Viet Cong lost 84 killed, seven captured, and 47 individual and two crew-served weapons. Friendly forces also seized a large quantity of ammunition.

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8. Free world forces conducted 80 battalion or larger-size operations during the week, 38 of them achieving contact--26 RVN, two ROK, and 10 US. There were 25,443 small-unit operations, including 2,930 conducted by US forces. Of the 151 which achieved contact with the enemy, 74 were conducted by US units.

9. Eleven B-52 missions totaling 99 aircraft were flown over South Vietnam during the week ending 10 April. The target areas were in Kien Phong, Phuoc Tuy, Tay Ninh, Quang Ngai, and Thua Thien provinces plus Free Bomb Zone A. Four of the missions were flown in support of Operation ABILENE (ground search and destroy), which commenced on 29 March. Initial poststrike photography reports of all missions indicate that a total of 858 impacts were within the targets areas, while 177 impacts were outside the target areas. During the period 1-7 April, a total of 2,897 tactical air strikes and armed reconnaissance sorties were flown by US Navy, Air Force, Marine, and VNAF aircraft. The cumulative results of these strikes as reported by the pilots include 2,520 structures, 66 sampans, 18 bunkers and trenches, and five rice storage areas destroyed; 1,976 structures, 53 sampans, and four bunkers and trenches damaged. There were 52 secondary explosions reported. Two VNAF A1H Skyraiders were lost to enemy ground fire. The two pilots, one of whom was American, were killed.

Communist Activities


10. The Viet Cong incident rate in I Corps continued higher than all other corps areas with 226 reported incidents. On 9 April a Viet Cong attack in Quang Ngai Province caused friendly losses of 12 killed and 12 weapons. Reportedly 98 Viet Cong were killed by an air attack during the action.

11. Little change was registered in the incident rate in II Corps. No attacks were reported.

12. On 8 April, the ARVN 1st Battalion, 50th Regiment, was attacked by an estimated two-company enemy force in northern Long An Province of III Corps. On the same date a Viet Cong force of unknown size

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CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD



Information as of 9 April 1966

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overran an outpost in the same province. No losses were reported in either action.

13. Viet Cong activity decreased in IV Corps. No significant attacks were reported. On 3 April, 10 rounds of British "25-pounder" artillery shells were fired at the Ai Cai Special Forces camp in Kien Phong Province, resulting in the death of one US soldier. The weapons reportedly were fired from Cambodian territory.

14. National Route 1 is closed south of Ho Duc, Quang Ngai Province; in a part of Quang Tin and Binh Dinh provinces, as well as in Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Vinh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Binh Tuy and Phuoc Tuy provinces. Route 14 is closed in Kontum Province north of Dak To and south of Pleiku City, Pleiku Province; in Darlac, Quang Duc, Phuoc Long, and Binh Long provinces. Interprovincial Route 1 is closed in Binh Duong and Phuoc Long provinces. Highway 9 is closed in Quang Tri Province.

15. The national railroad is operating between Saigon and Xuan Loc, Long Khanh Province; between Da Lat and Thap Cham, Ninh Thuan Province; between Da Nang, Quang Nam Province, and Hue, Thua Thien Province, and between Ca Na and Thap Cham, Ninh Thuan Province.

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C. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

1. According to the US Mission, the outlook for the Revolutionary Development program is a year of military offensives (which must precede the influx of cadre groups), organization, and training in 1966, while 1967 will be the year for major pacification progress. Military operations in the vicinity of the National Priority Areas relieve Viet Cong pressure on the target area, resulting in a more favorable climate in which the GVN can expand its control. Despite recent successful military operations, the Viet Cong still retain the capability to initiate actions which can disrupt planned pacification efforts.

2. The government objective for 1966 is to increase control over the total population from 52 to 66 percent. At this time, however, most provinces are behind schedule, although there is no cause for serious alarm. Reasons for the lag are the late formulation of the provincial plans, confused or contradictory instructions (from Saigon, corps, division, and province, all of which have a legal interest), and the lack of cadre. The latter problem will be partially alleviated when the cadre groups arrive in their provinces at mid-year, but the underlying basic factor of the lack of manpower will probably be aggravated as the various civilian and military organizations continue to vie for the productive sector of the male population.

3. The political crisis continues to affect the program adversely. For example, the I Corps National Priority Area is centered around Da Nang, and General Thang, the Revolutionary Development minister, has indicated his willingness to resign if the director-general of the National Police is removed as proposed by Premier Ky.

4. Returnees (Chieu Hoi). Total returnees for March, according to USIA, are 2,153 registered as compared with 2,011 for February, the previous record high. The embassy reports that 499 defectors returned to Chieu Hoi centers during the week beginning 3 April. This is yet another program that has been affected by the political crisis; officials feel

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
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that prospects for a continued increase in returnees have darkened. Recent decisions by the State Secretariat for Information and Chieu Hoi to reduce the salaries of the Chieu Hoi chiefs and to switch responsibility for psychological operations exploitation of returnees to the Vietnamese Information Service have resulted in 60 resignations from the Chieu Hoi program.

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II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC

1. On 11 April Hanoi announced that its official representation in Cambodia was being upgraded to the diplomatic level. The announcement followed the conclusion of a three-week visit of DRV Minister of Culture Hoang Minh Giam to Phnom Penh. It did not indicate at what level Hanoi will be represented in the Cambodian capital.

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the practical effect of this move will be to raise the North Vietnamese commercial mission, which has operated at a subconsular level since 1962, to something less than full embassy status.

2. The upgrading is a partial achievement by North Vietnam of a long sought after diplomatic victory which will tend to enhance its diplomatic presence in Southeast Asia.

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4. After several weeks of only muted comment on the subject of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, Hanoi has reaffirmed its opposition to any peaceful settlement except on its own "four-point" peace terms. An editorial in the party theoretical journal Hoc Tap and an article in the party daily on 8 April Hanoi celebrating the first anniversary of the pronouncement of the four points demonstrated that in the intervening year Hanoi's position on settling the war had not changed. Both the editorial and the party daily article stressed that the four points constituted a package that must be accepted "as a single entity." Special emphasis was placed on US acceptance of point three--which calls for

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settlement of South Vietnamese affairs without foreign interference and in accordance with the program of the Liberation Front.

5. This reaffirmation of Hanoi's position on a political settlement coming at this time may also in part, have been directed to Peking as evidence of the North Vietnamese determination to carry on the war and to the Liberation Front to shore up morale in the face of further US troop commitments.

6. Recent statements by both Soviet and Chinese leaders have reaffirmed their backing for Hanoi's policy on the war. Liu Shao-chi's remarks on Vietnam to Pakistani President Ayub Khan in late March appeared calculated to convey the impression that Peking is taking a "responsible" position in Southeast Asia and is ready for a long struggle. The Pakistani foreign minister informed US officials on 7 April that Liu had been "cool and relaxed" while discussing Vietnam and had emphasized to President Ayub that a settlement was possible only on the basis of the North Vietnamese four-point formula. Liu reportedly declared that the Chinese have no intention of intervening with troops in Vietnam or Laos but will continue giving military aid to these and other "wars of national liberation." He added that while North Vietnam had not asked for Chinese troop support, should Hanoi encounter serious difficulties as the result of US attacks and ask for direct Chinese intervention, China "will fully oblige." This is a restatement of the pledge Peking first made publicly last spring and represents no expansion of the Chinese commitment to aid Vietnam.

7. Moscow has not altered its basic position on Vietnam during the Soviet 23rd Party Congress. At the closing session, politburo member Suslov read the CPSU "Draft Declaration on Vietnam" which merely reiterated Moscow's well-worn public expressions of support for the DRV and restated Soviet willingness to continue support of the Vietnamese people. Suslov reaffirmed Moscow's public position that "the Vietnamese question can be resolved only on the basis of the recognition of the just demands of the DRV and the NFLSV."

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III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

FREE WORLD AID



On 11 April, the Philippine House of Representatives by a vote of 81-7 passed the Vietnam assistance bill which appropriates \$8.8 million for economic and technical assistance to South Vietnam and provides for the dispatch of a 2,000-man military engineering task force. In order to soften Senate opposition, President Marcos has reportedly promised to consult congressional leaders before sending the proposed task force in view of the present political crisis in South Vietnam. Nevertheless, there is considerable sentiment in the Senate to suspend action on the bill until the crisis subsides. Meanwhile, there are two reports indicating that substitute bills may be proposed in the Senate.

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SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS

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Total Friendly Forces Personnel Losses
(US/GVN/Other Free World)


Killed in action
 Missing or Captured in action
 Wounded in action

SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS


WEEKLY REPORT 2 APRIL - 9 APRIL 1966

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
Viet Cong Incidents



Viet Cong Attacks




Weapons Losses



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SOUTH VIETNAM: AIRCRAFT STATISTICS


MARCH, 1966



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
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
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Annual Totals

	Military	Totals
1964	1,903	14,465
1965	9,472	42,552
1966*	1,318	4,173

*Only thru 12 Feb

— Monthly Totals


■ Military

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SOUTH VIETNAM: DESERTION STATISTICS

MARCH, 1966



	Regular Forces	Totals
1962	11,203	29,924
1963	9,666	36,441
1964	21,441	73,010
1965	47,297	113,168

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GVN statistics do not differentiate between deserters who eventually return or enlist in other government units, remain AWOL, or defect to the Viet Cong. Statistics do show that 53% of the regular force desertions are among draftees who comprise 13% of the regular force strength.

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South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and
Weapons Losses: 1962 - 31 March 1966

1. General Statistical Data:

Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses		
		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	
Jan	1962	1825	299	1294	475	212	116	390	890	1896	-	-
	1963	927	453	1754	908	318	102	379	1463	2451	457	683
	1964	1770	343	1223	913	-	555	240	1811	1463	917	532
	1965	2206	904	2203	1938	-	471	565	3313	2768	1700	711
	1966	3914	747	2648	1557	-	450	588	2754	3236	935	979
Feb	1962	1460	244	1205	300	316	124	353	668	1874	-	-
	1963	788	379	1082	656	303	82	292	1117	1677	253	399
	1964	2078	374	1055	916	-	303	289	1593	1344	708	471
	1965	1982	880	1564	1840	-	1394	309	4114	1873	2454	620
	1966	3100	1015	4727	2095	-	477	508	3587	5235	1076	1219
Mar	1962	1961	523	1456	737	551	140	523	1400	2530	-	-
	1963	1282	410	1443	851	368	66	222	1327	2033	467	367
	1964	2160	439	1456	1249	-	345	531	2033	1987	814	532
	1965	2056	751	2022	1633	-	720	394	3104	2416	1442	698
	1966	3670	938	5685	1961	-	466	604	3365	6289	1393	1632
Apr	1962	1933	387	1596	532	292	151	415	1070	2303	-	-
	1963	1331	506	1660	878	256	96	388	1440	2304	797	468
	1964	2284	594	1671	1584	-	398	245	2576	1916	990	424
	1965	1860	591	1909	1650	-	232	529	2473	2438	757	973
May	1962	1825	390	1756	509	352	94	524	993	2632	-	-
	1963	1208	435	1895	889	295	94	695	1418	2885	463	564
	1964	2143	458	1135	987	-	202	242	1647	1377	723	281
	1965	2263	1049	1975	2143	-	873	548	4065	2523	1701	831
Jun	1962	1477	325	1666	613	413	77	441	1015	2520	-	-
	1963	1311	389	1863	772	310	90	437	1251	2609	580	394
	1964	2062	494	1005	1145	-	313	230	1952	1235	718	387
	1965	2597	1211	2208	1920	-	1260	189	4391	2397	2387	793
Jul	1962	1564	384	1544	686	424	212	542	1282	2510	-	-
	1963	1368	529	1918	1071	372	306	387	1906	2677	663	374
	1964	3045	900	1427	1812	-	510	219	3222	1646	1889	447
	1965	2520	1160	2980	1591	-	540	580	3425	3560	1375	882

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Time Period		Viet Cong Incidents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
			GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
Aug	1962	1642	377	2271	626	367	63	669	1066	3307	-	-
	1963	1349	411	1685	804	237	352	482	1567	2404	637	428
	1964	2580	721	1449	1612	-	478	282	2811	1731	1106	619
	1965	2498	808	3624	1945	-	287	606	3040	4230	705	1074
Sep	1962	1375	419	2218	646	365	59	446	1124	3029	-	-
	1963	1763	672	1982	1155	234	566	347	2393	2563	878	389
	1964	3091	819	1187	1759	-	737	230	3315	1417	1465	525
	1965	2473	655	3485	1724	-	266	838	2645	4323	778	838
Oct	1962	1357	365	1967	619	286	64	373	1048	2626	-	-
	1963	1422	428	1520	989	244	398	236	1815	2000	753	330
	1964	2827	739	1617	1583	-	693	576	3015	2193	1510	482
	1965	3330	961	3874	2416	-	225	660	3602	4534	762	1013
Nov	1962	1311	410	1982	834	368	92	561	1336	2911	-	-
	1963	3182	664	2333	1554	373	665	252	2883	2958	1595	455
	1964	1982	574	1747	1404	-	410	570	2388	2317	1104	515
	1965	3638	1034	5516	2056	-	520	592	3610	6108	1126	2164
Dec	1962	1346	294	2203	618	289	78	463	990	2955	-	-
	1963	1921	389	1440	961	191	320	190	1670	1821	724	546
	1964	2504	1002	1813	2053	-	1092	503	4147	2316	2111	666
	1965	4106	1239	4076	2262	-	926	516	4427	4592	1728	1158

Composite Annual Totals

Time Period	VC Incidents	KIA		WIA		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
1962	19076	4417	21158	7195	4235	1270	5700	12882	31093	5195	4049*
1963	17852	5665	20575	11488	3501	3137	4307	20290	28383	8267	5397
1964	28526	7457	16785	17017	-	6036	4157	30510	20942	14055	5881
1965	31529	11243	35436	23118	-	7848	6326	42209	41762	16915	11755
**1966	10684	2700	13060	5613	-	1393	1700	9706	14760	3404	3830

*Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses.

**Through 31 March 1966

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2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 31 March 1966

Time Period			A T T A C K S				Terrorism	Sabotage	Propa- ganda	Anti- Aircraft
			Small- Scale	Co. Size	BN. Size	Total				
Jan	1962	1825	528	21	0	549	839	180	257	-
	1963	927	242	8	2	252	447	49	179	-
	1964	1770	218	2	3	223	1244	129	174	-
	1965	2206	57	5	1	63	1489	272	170	212
	1966	3914	42	23	5	70	2490	312	299	743
Feb	1962	1460	480	20	0	500	613	137	210	-
	1963	788	181	13	1	195	433	69	91	-
	1964	2078	211	3	3	217	1389	210	271	-
	1965	1982	73	6	3	82	1411	267	91	131
	*1966	3100	50	10	9	69	1829	201	172	829
Mar	1962	1961	561	27	0	588	660	290	423	-
	1963	1282	333	11	0	344	653	131	154	-
	1964	2160	198	4	1	203	1632	158	167	-
	1965	2056	80	3	3	86	1476	240	90	164
	1966	3670	32	10	10	52	2332	212	154	920
Apr	1962	1933	470	27	0	497	1024	220	192	-
	1963	1331	371	9	3	383	688	105	155	-
	1964	2284	211	6	3	220	1738	169	157	-
	1965	1860	38	1	4	43	1407	149	96	165
May	1962	1825	490	28	0	528	892	154	251	-
	1963	1208	344	13	0	357	608	93	150	-
	1964	2143	170	3	2	175	418	217	140	193
	1965	2263	40	7	11	58	1558	365	115	170
Jun	1962	1477	339	23	0	362	736	157	222	-
	1963	1311	398	11	1	410	652	107	142	-
	1964	2062	128	10	2	140	1390	176	162	194
	1965	2597	62	1	6	69	1784	469	103	172

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Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S				Terrorism	Sabotage	Propa- ganda	Anti- Aircraft	
		Small-Scale	Co. Size	BN. Size	Total					
Jul	1962	1564	437	10	1	448	735	158	223	-
	1963	1368	398	8	1	407	698	80	183	-
	1964	3045	166	12	7	185	2132	286	224	218
	1965	2520	42	0	6	48	1706	400	154	212
Aug	1962	1642	368	10	0	378	885	146	233	-
	1963	1349	356	11	1	368	647	113	221	-
	1964	2580	107	3	3	113	1775	315	173	204
	1965	2498	38	9	5	52	1597	349	200	300
Sep	1962	1375	382	9	0	391	624	178	182	-
	1963	1763	483	17	3	503	889	164	207	-
	1964	3091	110	4	4	118	1938	482	178	375
	1965	2473	19	7	5	31	1530	278	185	449
Oct	1962	1357	406	12	1	419	583	189	166	-
	1963	1422	359	6	0	365	802	105	150	-
	1964	2827	75	2	6	83	1790	480	197	277
	1965	3330	24	8	12	44	1969	415	198	704
Nov	1962	1311	411	7	3	421	614	144	132	-
	1963	3182	631	11	3	645	1990	269	278	-
	1964	1982	57	2	1	60	1391	247	109	175
	1965	3638	26	16	10	52	2234	486	255	611
Dec	1962	1346	375	8	1	384	670	107	185	-
	1963	1921	258	3	0	261	1298	111	251	-
	1964	2504	81	9	6	96	1719	318	128	243
	1965	4106	32	18	7	57	2572	442	317	718

Composite Annual Totals

1962	19076	5247	6	212	5465	8875	2060	2676	No Data
1963	17852	4354	15	121	4490	9805	1396	2161	No Data
1964	28526	1732	41	60	1833	19556	3178	2080	1879
1965	31529	531	73	81	685	20730	4132	1974	4008
*1966	10684	124	43	24	191	6651	725	625	2492

*Through 31 March 1966

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
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SOUTH VIETNAM ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Consumer Price Index (For Working-Class Family in Saigon)


(1959=100)

January 1963 - January 1966




Money Supply (Billions of Piasters)

January 1964 - January 1966



Foreign Exchange Reserves (Millions of US Dollars)

January 1964 - February 1966



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